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Simon Chesterman

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Scholarship · International governance · AI safety and accountability

Simon Chesterman is a National University of Singapore law professor whose scholarship examines AI regulation, international law and public authority. His work considers both the adaptation of legal rules to automated systems and the relationship between public governance and private technological power.[1][2]

Roles and affiliations

Chesterman is David Marshall Professor of Law and Vice Provost for Educational Innovation at NUS, founding Dean of NUS College, and AI Governance and Policy Lead at the NUS AI Institute. He previously served as Dean of NUS Law from 2012 to 2022. These roles accompany a research portfolio covering international institutions, national security, AI policy and data protection.[1]

Contributions and positions

Regulating autonomous systems

We, the Robots? Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law examines how law responds to systems operating with decreasing human intervention. Chesterman considers what existing rules can accomplish, where additional institutions or restrictions may be needed, and whether AI itself might help perform regulatory functions. The book connects risk management with the legitimacy of public authority rather than treating regulation as solely a technical problem.[3]

Its examples extend across technologies such as automated trading, vehicles and algorithmic decision-making. The central questions concern the allocation of responsibility and the limits of delegation. The book's discussion of possible reforms is scholarship about legal design, not a statement that one common AI regime applies across jurisdictions.[3]

From ethical principles to implementation

In From Ethics to Law, Chesterman argues that agreement on broad AI principles does not by itself establish how they should be implemented. The paper asks why regulation is needed, when legal change is appropriate and how rules would operate. It distinguishes principles that echo existing legal duties from possible additional restrictions on the development or use of AI.[4]

The paper also discusses the legitimacy of delegating public decisions. In Chesterman's account, decisions affecting rights and obligations can require officials who remain answerable through political or constitutional institutions, even if automated tools promise efficiency. This is an argument about accountable public authority rather than a blanket claim that governments cannot use AI.[4]

International law and private power

Silicon Sovereigns shifts attention from competition among states to the imbalance between public institutions and private AI companies. Chesterman argues that debates framed only around technological optimism, catastrophe or international rivalry can overlook who receives benefits and who controls decisions. The article considers consequences for international law, global equity and democratic oversight. An open manuscript was posted in 2025; the repository identifies the journal publication as appearing in the American Journal of International Law in 2026.[2]

Selected works

News and coverage

References

Profile sources last reviewed September 7, 2026. Dated positions and developments are identified in the text.