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United States v Weber

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Case Information
Case name United States of America v. Jeremy Alan Weber[1]
Court U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; underlying U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas[1]
Docket Appeal 25-3201; district court 5:24-CR-40035-TC-1[1]
Filed Original prosecution and appeal filing dates not identified in the sources reviewed.[1]
Judge(s) Tymkovich, Matheson and Phillips (appellate panel)[1]
Prosecution United States of America (appellee)[1]
Defendants Jeremy Alan Weber (appellant)[1]
Case type Criminal sentencing appeal involving AI face-swapping[1]
Claims / issues Substantive reasonableness of a 300-month sentence for transportation and possession of child sexual abuse material; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A and 3553(a)[1]
Status October 8, 2026: sentence affirmed in a nonprecedential order and judgment.[1]

United States v. Weber is a federal sentencing appeal involving an AI face-swap service used to create altered child sexual abuse images. On October 8, 2026, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Jeremy Alan Weber’s 300-month prison sentence after rejecting his challenge to its substantive reasonableness.[1]

Background and sentence

The opinion recounts that Weber used an AI service to alter images to depict people he knew, including minors and adults. He pleaded guilty to five transportation counts and one possession count. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 151–188 months and imposed an upward variance to 300 months under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).[1]

October 8, 2026 appellate ruling

Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the panel held that the district court adequately justified the variance through the conduct’s breadth, additional victims, breach of trust and victim impact. It rejected Weber’s characterization of the conduct as mere possession, emphasizing that the altered images created a further group of victims. The court also considered the risk that the images could become public and distinguished earlier Second Circuit sentencing decisions involving different conduct.[1]

The order is not binding precedent except under law-of-the-case, res judicata and collateral-estoppel doctrines; it may be cited for persuasive value under the applicable federal and circuit rules.[1]

References