United States v Anderhub
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United States v Anderhub is a federal criminal case concerning alleged possession of unlawful sexual imagery, including material allegedly generated with AI. On October 21, 2026, Judge Philip A. Brimmer denied Jon Carl Anderhub’s as-applied First Amendment challenge to one obscenity-possession count. The court expressly declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in United States v Anderegg concerning wholly fictional depictions. The order decides a pretrial motion concerning Count Six; it does not determine guilt.[1]
Charges and scope of the motion
According to the October 21 order, a grand jury returned a six-count indictment on December 3, 2025. Count Six charges knowing possession of an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1). Section 1466A(c) provides that the depicted minor need not actually exist. The indictment alleges the interstate-commerce circumstances described in § 1466A(d)(4), including transportation of the depictions or use of materials transported in interstate or foreign commerce.[1]
Anderhub moved to dismiss Count Six on September 11, 2026. He argued that the First Amendment protected private possession in the home of obscene depictions created without abusing an actual child, relying on Stanley v. Georgia and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. He did not dispute obscenity for purposes of this motion. These were arguments for dismissal, not findings that the government had proved the charged offense.[1]
The government told the court that it would not rely on images made by altering photographs of actual people as the basis for Count Six. The court therefore limited its constitutional analysis to depictions of wholly fictional children. That limitation does not describe every category of material discussed in the order or resolve the remaining counts.[1]
October 21, 2026 order
Brimmer read Stanley’s protection for private possession in the home narrowly, citing subsequent Supreme Court decisions declining to extend it to receipt, importation or transportation of obscene material through commerce. He concluded that the interstate-commerce element charged under § 1466A(d)(4) distinguished Count Six from the private-possession prohibition addressed in Stanley. The order denied the motion to dismiss; it did not make a trial finding that the government had established that element.[1]
The order expressly disagreed with Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576, 585–586 (7th Cir. 2026), which reasoned that the commerce requirement did not change the punishment’s focus on possession of obscene material in the home. Brimmer instead followed the approach discussed in United States v. Yeasley (D. Idaho, November 3, 2025) and United States v. Handley (S.D. Iowa, 2008). This is a district-court disagreement with an out-of-circuit appellate decision, rather than a ruling by the Tenth Circuit or a resolution by the Supreme Court.[1]