AI & Law News for February 10, 2026

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United States v Heppner AI Privilege[edit]

United States v. Heppner, No. 25-cr-00503-JSR (S.D.N.Y.), is a February 10, 2026, ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York holding that documents generated by a defendant using the public AI tool Claude are not protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.[1][2][3]

Background[edit]

Defendant Bradley Heppner used the public AI tool Claude to generate documents, which the government sought access to during discovery. Heppner argued that the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege because he later shared the outputs with his lawyers, and alternatively that they were protected as work product.[1][2]

Holdings[edit]

Attorney-Client Privilege Inapplicable[edit]

The court held that no privilege applied because:[3][4]

  • Claude is not a licensed attorney, lacking the "trusting human relationship" required for privilege
  • Communications with Claude were not made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from counsel
  • Later sharing AI outputs with lawyers does not retroactively create privilege over preexisting documents
  • There was no reasonable expectation of confidentiality given Claude's privacy policy, which disclaims confidentiality and reserves disclosure rights

Work Product Doctrine Inapplicable[edit]

Work product protection also failed because Heppner created the documents on his own initiative, without counsel's direction, and they did not reflect the mental impressions or strategy of an attorney.[1][4]

Potential Waiver of Underlying Privilege[edit]

The court noted that inputting attorney communications into a public AI tool could potentially waive privilege over those underlying communications.[3]

Distinction from Warner v. Gilbarco[edit]

The same day, Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc. in the Eastern District of Michigan reached the opposite conclusion on work product, holding that a pro se plaintiff's AI-generated materials were protected because AI is a "tool, not a person."[4] The split highlights emerging circuit tensions over whether AI platforms should be treated as third parties (waiving privilege/work product) or neutral tools (preserving protection).

Issue Heppner (S.D.N.Y.) Warner v. Gilbarco (E.D. Mich.)
AI-Generated Materials Not protected Protected as work product
Waiver Analysis AI as third party per terms of service AI as "tool"; no adversary disclosure
Key Factor No counsel direction; AI terms allow third-party exposure Pro se status; litigation anticipation; tool vs. person

Implications[edit]

The ruling establishes that communications with public AI platforms are not privileged under existing doctrine. Organizations must review AI use policies; counsel-directed AI use might yield different results, but consumer AI tools risk privilege waiver.[3][5]

References[edit]

See individual article: United States v Heppner AI Privilege


Warner v Gilbarco AI Work Product[edit]

Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., No. 2:2024cv12333 (E.D. Mich.), is a February 10, 2026, ruling by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti holding that a pro se plaintiff's materials generated using AI tools like ChatGPT are protected under the work product doctrine.[1][2][3]

Background[edit]

Pro se plaintiff Sohyon Warner brought employment discrimination claims against Gilbarco, Inc. and Vontier Corporation. During discovery, defendants sought production of all documents and information about Warner's use of third-party AI tools (including ChatGPT) for litigation preparation, including deposition details on her prompts and outputs. Warner objected, asserting work product protection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).[1][2]

Holdings[edit]

Work Product Protection Applies[edit]

Magistrate Judge Patti held that materials qualified as work product because a pro se litigant acts as their own "party or representative," preparing them "in anticipation of litigation or for trial" under Rule 26(b)(3)(A). No attorney involvement is required for work product protection.[1][3]

No Waiver from AI Use[edit]

The court held that waiver requires disclosure "to an adversary or in a way likely to get in an adversary's hands." Generative AI like ChatGPT is a "tool, not [a] person[], even if they may have administrators somewhere in the background." Provider access does not trigger waiver, unlike attorney-client privilege (which requires no adversary disclosure).[1][2][3]

Additional Grounds[edit]

The court also found that the discovery request was irrelevant, disproportionate under Rule 26(b)(1), and sought protected "mental impressions" and thought processes. No case law supported the defendants' theory; their argument relied on a Law360 article.[3]

Distinction from Privilege[edit]

The court carefully distinguished work product (party-focused, narrower waiver) from attorney-client privilege (third-party disclosure waives). The ruling applies specifically to work product doctrine analysis, not to privilege.[2]

Distinction from United States v. Heppner[edit]

The same day, United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y.) reached the opposite conclusion, holding that AI-generated documents are not protected. The split creates emerging circuit tension over whether AI platforms should be treated as third parties or neutral tools.[3]

Issue Warner v. Gilbarco (E.D. Mich.) Heppner (S.D.N.Y.)
AI-Generated Materials Protected as work product Not protected
AI Characterization "Tool, not a person" Third party per terms of service
Key Factor Pro se status; litigation anticipation No counsel direction; public AI terms

Implications[edit]

This ruling adopts a "literal, party-centric" view of Rule 26(b)(3)(A), prioritizing litigation anticipation over creation method or tool privacy risks. Litigants should document AI use as "anticipation of litigation" to invoke protection. No appeal or further docket updates have been noted as of April 13, 2026.[1][2]

References[edit]

See individual article: Warner v Gilbarco AI Work Product


Categories[edit]