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Warner v Gilbarco

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Case Information
Case name Warner v. Gilbarco[1][2]
Court U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan[1][2]
Docket 2:24-cv-12333-GAD-APP[1][2]
Filed September 6, 2024[1][2]
Judge(s) Gershwin A. Drain; Anthony P. Patti (discovery magistrate judge)[1][2]
Plaintiffs Sohyon Warner[1][2]
Defendants Gilbarco, Inc. (Gilbarco Veeder-Root); Vontier Corporation[1][2]
Case type Civil employment-discrimination action[1][2]
Claims / issues Employment discrimination and retaliation; discovery / work-product protection for AI-assisted litigation materials[1][2]
Status February 10, 2026: discovery order protected litigation thought processes and strategy; later case disposition not verified.[1][2]

Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc. (Case No. 2:24-CV-12333, E.D. Mich.) is an employment discrimination case in which a federal magistrate judge ruled that a pro se plaintiff's AI-assisted litigation materials are protected under the work product doctrine. The rulings in this case and the related discussion of AI work product turn on their different factual records.[3]


February 10, 2026: discovery order protected litigation thought processes and strategy; later case disposition not verified.[1][2]

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Warner — pro se litigant (acting as her own counsel) in an employment discrimination action

Defendants

  • Gilbarco, Inc. and others

Court

  • Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
  • Case No.: 2:24-CV-12333
  • Citation: Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., 2026 WL 373043 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026)

Factual Background

Warner, a pro se employment discrimination plaintiff, used generative AI tools including ChatGPT to prepare litigation materials in connection with her lawsuit against Gilbarco. Defendants moved to compel production of "all documents and information concerning her use of third-party AI tools in connection with this lawsuit," arguing that using public AI tools waived attorney-client privilege and work product protection because the AI interactions constituted disclosures to third parties.[4][5]

Ruling (February 10, 2026)

A federal magistrate judge denied the motion to compel, holding that the AI-assisted materials were protected under the work product doctrine.[4][3]

Work Product Doctrine — Protected

The court held that Warner's AI-assisted materials qualified as work product under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) because they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. As a pro se litigant acting as her own counsel, Warner could assert work product protection over her litigation preparations regardless of the medium used.[4][6]

Key reasoning:

  • AI tools are tools, not persons — The court rejected the argument that using ChatGPT constitutes disclosure to a third party, stating that "AI tools are tools, not persons"[4][3]
  • Work product protects thought processes regardless of medium — The doctrine protects a party's litigation-related thought processes and preparation, regardless of whether a pen, computer, or AI tool was used[4]
  • No waiver from AI provider access — Work product waiver requires disclosure "to an adversary or in a way likely to get in an adversary's hand." The court found no waiver on this record.[3][7]

Attorney-Client Privilege — Not Extended

The court did not extend attorney-client privilege to the AI-assisted materials, noting that the privilege applies to human attorney-client communications. However, this was not dispositive because the work product doctrine provided independent protection.[5][3]

Comparison with United States v. Heppner

In February 2026, Judge Rakoff in United States v Heppner (S.D.N.Y.) addressed a different factual record, denying both privilege and work product protection for AI-generated materials. Key distinctions:[3][8]

Factor Warner (E.D. Mich.) Heppner (S.D.N.Y.)
Case type Civil employment Criminal fraud
Counsel status Pro se (own counsel) Had counsel, acted independently
Work product Protected — pro se can assert Denied — no counsel direction
Privilege Not extended (not needed) Denied — no attorney-client communication
AI characterization "Tools, not persons" Third-party disclosure

The critical distinction is Warner's pro se status: as her own counsel, her litigation preparations qualify as work product even if made with AI assistance. Heppner, who had counsel but acted independently of counsel, could not establish the necessary connection to attorney-directed work.

Significance

Warner v. Gilbarco establishes that:

  • Pro se litigants' AI-assisted materials can qualify for work product protection[4]
  • Courts may treat AI tools as tools rather than third-party recipients for waiver analysis[3]
  • The medium of preparation (AI vs. manual) does not determine work product protection — the purpose and context of creation matter[6]
  • Work product and attorney-client privilege are distinct doctrines that must be analyzed separately for AI-generated materials[7]
  • Court: U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
  • Case No.: 2:24-CV-12333
  • Citation: 2026 WL 373043 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026)
  • Ruling Date: February 10, 2026

See Also

References