United States policy on catastrophic AI risk: Difference between revisions

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<div class="ailaw-legislation-nav" style="font-size:0.92em; margin-bottom:1.2em;">[[AI Policy]] · [[Legislation and Regulation|Legislation & Regulation]] · [[United States Federal Authorities|United States — Federal]] · [[AI Law by Topic|Browse by topic]]</div>

'''United States policy on catastrophic AI risk''' encompasses measures intended to prevent advanced artificial intelligence from enabling mass harm or escaping effective human control. The approaches range from developer transparency and independent audits to government testing, restrictions on dangerous uses, liability, negotiated slowdowns, and proposed prohibitions on superintelligence. These approaches assign different roles to developers, regulators, courts, and national-security agencies.<ref name="ca-report">Joint California Policy Working Group on AI Frontier Models, [https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/June-17-2025-%E2%80%93-The-California-Report-on-Frontier-AI-Policy.pdf ''The California Report on Frontier AI Policy''], June 17, 2025, executive summary and sections 1–3.</ref><ref name="licensing">Senators Richard Blumenthal and Josh Hawley, [https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09072023bipartisanaiframework.pdf ''Bipartisan Framework for U.S. AI Act''], September 2023.</ref><ref name="ban">Office of Senator Bernie Sanders, [https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/news-sanders-casar-introduce-legislation-to-ban-artificial-superintelligence-and-temporarily-pause-advanced-ai-development/ ''Sanders, Casar to Introduce Legislation to Ban Artificial Superintelligence and Temporarily Pause Advanced AI Development''], September 3, 2026.</ref>

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The California frontier-policy report approaches uncertainty differently, recommending empirical investigation and adaptable safeguards. These positions expose a policy choice about the allocation of oversight and research resources; neither a catastrophe-focused statute nor this article's narrower scope substitutes for protections against discrimination and other present harms.<ref name="ca-report" />

In a September 18, 2026 discussion, MIT Technology Review journalists Grace Huckins and Will Douglas Heaven presented differing assessments of extinction risk. Huckins emphasized uncertainty and the need for stronger transparency rules; Heaven argued that extinction scenarios lack grounding in present capabilities and can distract from immediate harms. Both discussed difficulties in monitoring autonomous agents. Their exchange illustrates disagreement about risk framing alongside shared concern about oversight.<ref name="mittr-risk-debate">[https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/09/18/1144435/could-ai-really-kill-us-all-your-questions-answered/ Will Douglas Heaven and Grace Huckins, MIT Technology Review, “Could AI really kill us all? Your questions, answered,” September 18, 2026.]</ref>

In a September 20, 2026 CBS interview, Nvidia’s Jensen Huang rejected near-term extinction predictions and advocated enforcing existing liability and computer-access laws.<ref name="huang-cbs">[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jensen-huang-nvidia-rejects-ai-extinction-warnings/ CBS News, Jensen Huang interview, published September 20, 2026.]</ref>

== Comparison of approaches ==

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| [[#State laws: transparency, audits, and preventive duties|Transparency and safety plans]] || Disclose risks and enforce compliance with developer frameworks || California SB 53<ref name="ca-ag">California Department of Justice, [https://oag.ca.gov/sb53 ''Catastrophic Risks in Artificial Intelligence Foundation Models''], official SB 53 guidance and employee-reporting information, accessed September 11, 2026.</ref>; [[New York RAISE Act]]<ref name="ny">New York Senate, [https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S8828 ''S8828, 2025–2026 session''], signed March 27, 2026, Chapter 96; text of General Business Law Article 44-B and §§ 3–5 of the amending act.</ref> || California: enacted, operative requirements.<br>New York: enacted; amended principal requirements effective January 1, 2027.

|-

| [[#Illinois: external audits|Independent verification]] || External examination of compliance and safety practices || [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]]<ref name="illinois">Office of Governor JB Pritzker, [https://gov-pritzker-newsroom.prezly.com/gov-pritzker-signs-nation-leading-artificial-intelligence-safety-law ''Gov. Pritzker Signs Nation-Leading Artificial Intelligence Safety Law''], July 6, 2026.</ref> || Enacted July 6, 2026; effective January 1, 2027.

| [[#Illinois: external audits|Independent verification]] || External examination of compliance and safety practices || [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]]<ref name="illinois">Office of Governor JB Pritzker, [https://gov-pritzker-newsroom.prezly.com/gov-pritzker-signs-nation-leading-artificial-intelligence-safety-law ''Gov. Pritzker Signs Nation-Leading Artificial Intelligence Safety Law''], July 6, 2026.</ref> || Enacted July 6, 2026; Act effective January 1, 2027. Audit duty starts January 1, 2028 or 90 days after first qualifying, whichever is later.<ref name="il-enacted-dates">Illinois General Assembly, [https://my.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/PublicActs/104/104-0538.htm Public Act 104-0538], Sections 10(a), 10(d) and 99; approved July 6, 2026. Enacted text reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref>

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| [[#Licensing, mandatory testing, and federal supervision|Federal testing and oversight]] || Mandatory risk assessment or supervised testing || [[FRONTIER Act (119th Congress)|FRONTIER Act (H.R. 9925)]]<ref name="frontier">U.S. Congress, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr9925ih/html/BILLS-119hr9925ih.htm ''H.R. 9925, FRONTIER Act''], introduced July 23, 2026, especially §§ 4–9.</ref>; Secure AI Development Act<ref name="warner-release">Office of Senator Mark Warner, [https://www.warner.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warner-rolls-out-comprehensive-ai-legislative-agenda-focused-on-responsible-innovation-workers-and-national-security/ ''Warner Rolls Out Comprehensive AI Legislative Agenda Focused on Responsible Innovation, Workers, and National Security''], July 21, 2026.</ref> || FRONTIER: introduced bill, July 23, 2026.<br>Secure AI Development: published legislative proposal, July 2026.

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=== Illinois: external audits ===

The Act takes effect January 1, 2027, but Section 10(a) starts the frontier-AI framework duty on January 1, 2028. Under Section 10(d), annual independent audits begin on January 1, 2028 or 90 days after a developer first qualifies as a large frontier developer, whichever is later.<ref name="il-enacted-dates">Illinois General Assembly, [https://my.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/PublicActs/104/104-0538.htm Public Act 104-0538], Sections 10(a), 10(d) and 99; approved July 6, 2026. Enacted text reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref>

The [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]] adds independent third-party audits to a framework of public safety disclosures, incident reports, compliance processes, and whistleblower protections. The governor's July 6, 2026 signing announcement identifies January 1, 2027 as its effective date. Independent examination is a distinct safeguard because it introduces scrutiny beyond the developer's own public account of its practices.<ref name="illinois" />

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The [[NIST AI Risk Management Framework]] is voluntary guidance for organizations developing, deploying, or using AI. It provides a general risk-management structure rather than a government determination that a particular model is safe.<ref name="rmf">NIST, [https://www.nist.gov/publications/artificial-intelligence-risk-management-framework-ai-rmf-10 ''Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)''], January 26, 2023.</ref> NIST's January 2025 draft misuse guidance offers a more targeted sequence: identify risks, plan responses, protect access, measure and mitigate risks before deployment, monitor misuse, and disclose practices. It cautions that safeguards can be brittle and that following the practices cannot guarantee prevention of misuse.<ref name="nist-misuse" />

Corporate policies can link capability assessments to stronger safeguards, but their content and strength can change. Anthropic's February 2026 explanation of Responsible Scaling Policy version 3.0 separates company plans from industry-wide recommendations and describes its Frontier Safety Roadmap goals as nonbinding public targets. It also introduces recurring risk reports and external review in specified circumstances. This illustrates why a corporate roadmap, an operational commitment, and a legally required compliance framework need separate treatment.<ref name="rsp">Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/news/responsible-scaling-policy-v3 ''Responsible Scaling Policy: Version 3.0''], February 24, 2026, explanation of the revision. This citation describes that dated revision rather than asserting that it is the latest policy version.</ref>

Corporate policies can link capability assessments to stronger safeguards, but their content and strength can change. [[Anthropic]]'s February 2026 explanation of Responsible Scaling Policy version 3.0 separates company plans from industry-wide recommendations and describes its Frontier Safety Roadmap goals as nonbinding public targets. It also introduces recurring risk reports and external review in specified circumstances. This illustrates why a corporate roadmap, an operational commitment, and a legally required compliance framework need separate treatment.<ref name="rsp">Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/news/responsible-scaling-policy-v3 ''Responsible Scaling Policy: Version 3.0''], February 24, 2026, explanation of the revision. This citation describes that dated revision rather than asserting that it is the latest policy version.</ref>

=== AI agents and military applications ===

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=== Insurance regulation and market practice ===

For coverage and dispute guides, see [[Insurance]], [[Insurance coverage for AI-related losses]] and [[AI in insurance claims and underwriting disputes]].

Insurance regulation already addresses insurers' own use of AI. The NAIC adopted a model bulletin in December 2023 setting expectations for written governance programs, risk management, lawful consumer outcomes, and examination records. It is guidance for state regulators rather than a model statute.<ref name="naic">NAIC, December 4, 2023, [https://content.naic.org/article/naic-members-approve-model-bulletin-use-ai-insurers “NAIC Members Approve Model Bulletin on Use of AI by Insurers”].</ref> New York's July 2024 Circular Letter No. 7 sets supervisory expectations for AI and external data in underwriting and pricing, including discrimination testing, actuarial validity, senior oversight, and vendor diligence.<ref name="dfs">New York Department of Financial Services, July 11, 2024, [https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry-guidance/circular-letters/cl2024-07 Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 (2024)].</ref> These measures govern insurance decisions; they do not require insurers to cover frontier-model catastrophes.

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== Pacing agreements, pauses, and bans ==

On September 13, 2026, President Trump responded to calls for an AI slowdown by emphasizing competition with China and acknowledging possible safeguards without specifying new rules.<ref name="trump-pool-sept13">[https://pool.pp.tools/reports/9002 Meridith McGraw, White House travel pool report 18, September 13, 2026, remarks at Doonbeg]. Contemporary reporter notes, archived by White House Pool.</ref><ref name="trump-ap-sept13">[https://apnews.com/article/trump-artificial-intelligence-guardrails-china-midterms-congress-9df0ebb4c1b0619aa0f88057b5a1092d Darlene Superville and Didi Tang, Associated Press, “Trump downplays the need to check AI development and says he doesn’t want to cede edge to China,” September 13, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 13, 2026#Trump stresses competition with China in response to AI slowdown calls|September 13 coverage]].

On September 13, 2026, House Speaker Mike Johnson opposed an emergency AI moratorium and proposed industry–government talks on safeguards, citing competition with China.<ref name="cnn-johnson-sept13">[https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/sotu/date/2026-09-13/segment/01 CNN, State of the Union, interview with House Speaker Mike Johnson, September 13, 2026, 9 a.m. ET]. Rush transcript.</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 13, 2026#Johnson opposes emergency AI moratorium and proposes industry talks|September 13 coverage]].

On September 12, CNN reported [[Dario Amodei]]’s pacing proposal and Anthropic’s commitment to embedded external evaluators.<ref name="cnn-pacing">[https://keyt.com/news/money-and-business/cnn-business-consumer/2026/09/12/anthropic-ceo-calls-for-pacing-the-frontier-of-ai-race-amid-safety-concerns/ Auzinea Bacon, CNN via KEYT, “Anthropic CEO calls for ‘pacing the frontier’ of AI race amid safety concerns,” September 12, 2026].</ref>

On September 12, 2026, [[OpenAI]] chief executive Sam Altman endorsed [[Dario Amodei|Amodei]]’s pacing call and said OpenAI would also give independent evaluators access comparable to employees, with further details to follow. This was an announced commitment, not confirmation that the arrangement was already operating.<ref name="altman-evaluators">[https://x.com/sama/status/2098811563415150910 Sam Altman, public statement on frontier pacing and independent evaluators, X, September 12, 2026]. Full public post reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref><ref name="cnn-pacing">[https://keyt.com/news/money-and-business/cnn-business-consumer/2026/09/12/anthropic-ceo-calls-for-pacing-the-frontier-of-ai-race-amid-safety-concerns/ Auzinea Bacon, CNN via KEYT, “Anthropic CEO calls for ‘pacing the frontier’ of AI race amid safety concerns,” September 12, 2026].</ref>

On September 12, Clément Delangue announced the Open Alignment Initiative, led by Thomas Wolf at Hugging Face, and requested participation in the embedded-evaluator program. He argued for broader participation and transparency in alignment work; the announcement does not confirm acceptance into the program.<ref name="delangue-alignment">[https://x.com/ClementDelangue/status/2098790988034580852 Clément Delangue, announcement of the Open Alignment Initiative, X, September 12, 2026]. Public post reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 12, 2026#Amodei proposes pacing AI development and embedded evaluators|September 12 coverage]].

On September 4, 2026, [[Scott Wiener]] and other state lawmakers called for a '''Mutually Agreed Pacing Framework''': an agreement among frontier laboratories, independently verified, to pace capability development while safety work catches up. The announcement expressly presented this as additional to state, federal, and international action. Laboratory participation and an enforceable agreement would require further negotiation.<ref name="pacing" />

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The [[EU AI Act]] combines several regulatory layers. Its prohibited-practice rules address specified unacceptable uses, while its high-risk system regime focuses on applications such as employment and access to essential services. Those categories cover harms much broader than catastrophe. The closer comparator for U.S. frontier-model policy is the Act's separate regime for <b>[[EU AI Act#General-purpose AI models|general-purpose AI models with systemic risk]]</b>: providers face additional duties to assess and mitigate those risks, with supervision by the European AI Office. General-purpose model obligations began applying in August 2025, with AI Office enforcement powers applying from August 2026, subject to the Act's transitional arrangements. A voluntary code of practice supports compliance with underlying legal obligations. This structure combines application-specific protections with model-level systemic-risk oversight, rather than treating either category as a substitute for the other.<ref name="eu-comparison">European Commission, accessed September 12, 2026, [https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai “AI Act” — regulatory framework and implementation timeline].</ref>

== Management-based regulation ==

[[Cary Coglianese]] and Colton R. Crum advocate adaptable risk-management duties with continuing human oversight, rather than relying principally on fixed technical prescriptions. Their 2025 scholarship concerns AI risks broadly and offers a regulatory-design comparison for frontier-AI oversight; it is not an enacted requirement or a demonstrated safety guarantee.<ref name="people-ten-leashes">[https://pennreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Coglianese-Crum-Leashes-Not-Guardrails.pdf Cary Coglianese and Colton R. Crum, Leashes, not guardrails: A management-based approach to artificial intelligence risk regulation, Risk Analysis (2025), DOI 10.1111/risa.70020]. Accessed September 12, 2026.</ref>

== Central design questions ==

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Finally, accountability requires attention to institutional capacity and incentives. The Blumenthal–Hawley proposal addresses conflicts of interest in an oversight body; Illinois emphasizes independent audits; and the liability debate asks whether courts and insurers can identify and deter risks effectively. These mechanisms can be combined, but none should be described as a demonstrated guarantee against catastrophic harm.<ref name="licensing" /><ref name="illinois" /><ref name="insurance" /><ref name="nist-misuse" />

== September 14, 2026: response from China ==

On September 14, 2026, China’s foreign ministry urged international cooperation on AI in response to [[Anthropic]] chief executive [[Dario Amodei]]’s proposal to retain US restrictions on advanced chips and chipmaking equipment. Spokesperson Guo Jiakun said confrontation and fear-based competition would undermine global AI governance.<ref name="china-ap-sept14">[https://apnews.com/article/china-anthropic-ai-us-amodei-3da458d2c078da3e60900728d59f1ae8 E. Eduardo Castillo and Chan Ho-him, Associated Press, “Beijing hits back at Anthropic CEO’s call to curb China’s AI development,” September 14, 2026].</ref>

See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#China responds to Amodei on AI cooperation and export controls|September 14 digest]] for the response and the proposal’s international-coordination context.

== Microsoft model-conduct consultation ==

On September 14, 2026, Microsoft AI proposed a code for its own models centered on human control, correction and shutdown. It opened six weeks of consultation before revising the training framework. These are company policy proposals.<ref name="mai-consult">[https://microsoft.ai/news/mai-code-of-conduct/ Microsoft AI, “Humanist AI in practice: A public consultation on our Code of Conduct for MAI Models,” September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Microsoft opens consultation on human-control code for its AI models|September 14 coverage]].

== September 14, 2026: Trump on AI safeguards ==

President Trump argued that existing criminal and regulatory powers and presidential leadership were sufficient safeguards, while warning that opposition to AI development would benefit China.<ref name="trump-reuters-sept14">[https://wmbdradio.com/2026/09/14/trump-says-there-is-a-sick-conspiracy-against-ai-data-centers/ Bhargav Acharya and Katharine Jackson, Reuters via WMBD, “Trump says there is a sick conspiracy against AI, data centers,” September 14, 2026].</ref> His statements expressed opposition to further controls; they did not themselves create a new regulatory instrument.<ref name="trump-ap-sept14">[https://www.wtvm.com/2026/09/14/trump-dismisses-new-ai-guardrails-says-there-is-sick-conspiracy-against-ai-data-centers/ Josh Boak, Associated Press via WTVM, “Trump dismisses new AI guardrails, says there is a ‘SICK conspiracy’ against AI and data centers,” September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Trump rejects additional AI guardrails and invokes existing powers|September 14 coverage]].

== September 14, 2026: Obama and Harris on oversight ==

Obama called for wider public participation in AI decisions.<ref name="obama-sept14">[https://x.com/BarackObama/status/2099642023922036982 Barack Obama, public statement on AI development and public participation, September 14, 2026].</ref> Harris urged legislation, a federal oversight and testing entity, and an international treaty on dangerous uses, development speed and testing.<ref name="harris-sept14">[https://x.com/KamalaHarris/status/2099598534831911394 Kamala Harris, public statement on frontier-AI oversight and international cooperation, September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Obama and Harris urge government action on frontier AI|September 14 digest coverage]] for these policy proposals.

== September 15, 2026: competing approaches in Congress ==

On September 15, 2026, Sanders’s prepared remarks called for binding international safety rules and a US–China treaty, and announced plans to introduce the Sanders–Casar superintelligence-ban proposal the following week.<ref name="sanders-sept15">[https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/prepared-remarks-sanders-regulating-ai-is-as-american-as-apple-pie/ Office of Senator Bernie Sanders, prepared remarks for the Pro-Human Assembly, September 15, 2026].</ref> Daines opposed slowing development in competition with China and advocated discussion involving private-sector experts and public officials.<ref name="daines-sept15">[https://www.daines.senate.gov/2026/09/15/daines-on-fox-news-we-need-to-be-gold-medalists-in-the-ai-race/ Office of Senator Steve Daines, transcript excerpts from his Fox News interview on AI policy, September 15, 2026].</ref> Johnson again favored industry self-regulation and opposed a moratorium, while Senate negotiations remained unresolved, according to Roll Call.<ref name="congress-rollcall-sept15">[https://rollcall.com/2026/09/15/ai-threats-confront-a-congress-far-from-erecting-guardrails/ Allison Mollenkamp and Savannah Behrmann, Roll Call, “AI threats confront a Congress far from erecting guardrails,” September 15, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 15, 2026#US lawmakers divide over AI pauses, regulation and competition with China|September 15 digest coverage]].

== RAND proposal: preserving strategic options ==

On September 15, 2026, RAND published Joel B. Predd and coauthors' ''A U.S. Strategy to Secure Geopolitical Advantage on an Uncertain Path to Superintelligence: Maintaining Freedom of Action''. The authors propose preserving the ability to choose among competing strategies as evidence develops, while pursuing U.S. geopolitical advantage and human survival and agency. This is an expert policy proposal, not an adopted government strategy.<ref name="rand-freedom-publication">RAND, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA5105-1.html ''A U.S. Strategy to Secure Geopolitical Advantage on an Uncertain Path to Superintelligence: Maintaining Freedom of Action''], published September 15, 2026, PE-A5105-1, DOI: 10.7249/PEA5105-1.</ref>

The paper identifies five unresolved questions: the proximity of danger, human–AI coexistence, the feasibility of cooperative restraint, the possibility of decisive advantage, and the ability to suppress rival programs. It argues that both premature commitment and excessive delay can eliminate options. Its recommendations combine investment in human–AI coexistence, AI security, adaptation of national-security institutions, and societal capacity to respond, with monitoring of technological and strategic changes. The authors advocate making commitments when evidence supports them or further delay would close an option.<ref name="rand-freedom-summary">Joel B. Predd et al., [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA5100/PEA5105-1/RAND_PEA5105-1.pdf ''Maintaining Freedom of Action''], RAND, September 2026, summary, p. v. Recommendations and strategic judgments are attributed to the authors.</ref>

== September 16, 2026: House members press for legislation ==

On September 16, 2026, ten bipartisan House members led by Don Beyer urged House leaders to accelerate AI oversight, security and transparency legislation, including independent oversight and stronger monitoring. Their letter requested legislative action; it did not enact requirements.<ref name="beyer-letter-sept16">[https://beyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=9218 Office of Representative Don Beyer, “Bipartisan Delegation Urges House Leaders To Take Immediate Action On Artificial Intelligence,” September 16, 2026, including the letter’s full text].</ref> Four Democratic members also urged shortening or cancelling the forthcoming recess to work on safeguards.<ref name="nextgov-house-sept16">[https://www.nextgov.com/artificial-intelligence/2026/09/house-democrats-call-cancel-upcoming-recess-time-legislate-ai/416020/ Alexandra Kelley, Nextgov/FCW, “House Democrats call to cancel upcoming recess for time to legislate on AI,” September 16, 2026].</ref>

See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#House members press leaders to advance AI legislation|September 16 digest coverage]].

== September 16, 2026: Warren calls for a pause ==

On September 16, 2026, Senator Elizabeth Warren called for an immediate pause in advanced AI development while lawmakers and regulators establish safeguards. She urged enforcement of existing laws and new legislation, rejected industry-led pacing as insufficient and opposed weakening antitrust protections. This was a policy statement, not an enacted pause.<ref name="warren-pause-sept16">[https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-calls-for-pause-in-advanced-ai-development/ Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, “Senator Warren Calls for Pause in Advanced AI Development,” September 16, 2026].</ref>

Axios reported that her position stopped short of endorsing Senator Bernie Sanders’s [[Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act|proposed ban on superintelligence]], distinguishing the two approaches.<ref name="axios-warren-sept16">[https://www.axios.com/2026/09/16/warren-ai-pause Maria Curi, Axios, “Exclusive: Warren backs pause on advanced AI,” September 16, 2026].</ref>

See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#Warren urges immediate pause in advanced AI development|September 16 digest coverage]].

== September 17, 2026: Shapiro and transparency measurements ==

On September 17, 2026, [[Pennsylvania AI Law|Pennsylvania]] Governor Josh Shapiro called for federal AI regulation and international cooperation, including engagement with China, at the AI Horizons Summit. His prepared remarks advocate independent third-party oversight of frontier models, transparency and safety measures. He rejected a choice between unchecked development and an indefinite halt. This is advocacy in the AI-safety policy debate, rather than a new law or executive order.<ref name="shapiro-sept17">[https://www.pa.gov/governor/newsroom/2026-press-releases/gov--shapiro-s-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-at-the-ai-horizo Governor of Pennsylvania, remarks as prepared for delivery at the AI Horizons 2026 Summit, September 17, 2026.]</ref><ref name="wesa-sept17">[https://www.wesanews.org/politics-government/2026-09-17/shapiro-calls-on-trump-to-regulate-artificial-intelligence-development Kiley Koscinski and Chris Potter, WESA, “Shapiro calls on Trump to regulate artificial intelligence development,” September 17, 2026.]</ref>

On September 17, 2026, [[Anthropic]] published proposed measurements of AI-led research, agent oversight and computing-resource allocation to inform public scrutiny of frontier development. Its August snapshot says Claude leads 26% of measured research-and-development work under human supervision; no measured subset is fully autonomous. The company proposes external verification and acknowledges methodological limits. This is a voluntary transparency initiative relevant to the debate over pacing AI development, not a regulatory requirement.<ref name="anthropic-measures">[https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pace-of-ai-development Anthropic, “Measurements for understanding the pace of AI development inside frontier labs,” September 17, 2026.]</ref><ref name="anthropic-reuters">[https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/anthropic-says-claude-now-leads-a-quarter-of-work-building-its-next-ai-models-4906530 Reuters via Investing.com, “Anthropic says Claude now leads a quarter of work building its next AI models,” September 17, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 17, 2026#Shapiro calls for federal AI safeguards|Shapiro coverage]] and [[AI Law Wiki News for September 17, 2026#Anthropic publishes measures for monitoring frontier development|Anthropic coverage]].

== September 16, 2026: bishops advocate safeguards ==

The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops created an AI task force chaired by Bishop Oscar Cantú on September 16, 2026. More than a dozen bishops also met members of Congress to advocate AI safety legislation and online protections for children. This was a civil-society advocacy initiative, not government action.<ref name="bishops-sept16">[https://www.usccb.org/news/2026/us-bishops-administrative-committee-establishes-task-force-artificial-intelligence USCCB, “U.S. Bishops’ Administrative Committee Establishes a Task Force on Artificial Intelligence,” September 16, 2026.]</ref><ref name="bishops-ewtn">[https://www.ewtnnews.com/world/us/u-s-bishops-launch-task-force-to-protect-human-dignity-amid-rise-of-artificial-intelligence Daniel Payne, EWTN News, “U.S. bishops launch task force to promote human dignity amid rise of artificial intelligence,” September 16, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#US bishops establish AI task force and press Congress for safeguards|September 16 digest coverage]].

== September 18, 2026: California oversight order ==

[[California Executive Order N-9-26|California’s N-9-26 order]] directs faster implementation of independent oversight programs and recommendations by November 16 on onsite evaluators, verified safety documentation, shutdown mechanisms and incident reporting. The order directs agency work; the listed potential duties for developers remain subjects for recommendations.<ref name="ca-n9-order">[https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/FINAL-N-9-26-AI-EO-9.18.26-SIGNED.pdf Governor of California, Executive Order N-9-26, signed September 18, 2026, paragraphs 1–3.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 18, 2026#California accelerates AI oversight and seeks shutdown-safeguard recommendations|September 18 coverage]].

== September 18, 2026: antitrust complaint over coordination ==

In [[Buist v Anthropic PBC|Buist v. Anthropic PBC]], four consumers sued Anthropic, OpenAI OpCo LLC, SpaceXAI LLC and Google LLC, alleging an agreement to slow improvements in competing AI subscriptions. The proposed class action seeks damages and injunctive relief.<ref name="buist-complaint">[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ufb8Bg9RA9LmRKOvXSm9UbP9YITI9sDq/view Buist et al. v. Anthropic PBC et al., No. 3:26-cv-10693 (N.D. Cal.), ECF 1, filed September 18, 2026, pp. 1–7, 25–29.]</ref>

== September 19, 2026: AI Force announcement ==

Trump announced an AI Force and a forthcoming AI-czar appointment, emphasizing industry growth and existing criminal and civil enforcement.<ref name="trump-ai-force-post">[https://www.trumpstruth.org/statuses/41808 Donald J. Trump, Truth Social statement, September 19, 2026, 1:12 p.m. EDT, status 117298821562014906; full text preserved by Trump’s Truth.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 19, 2026#Trump announces planned AI Force and AI czar|September 19 digest coverage]].

== September 20, 2026: Khanna on federal and international oversight ==

Khanna advocated an expert-led federal AI regulator and internationally monitored safeguards in his September 20 CBS interview.<ref name="khanna-cbs-sept20">[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-full-transcript-09-20-2026/ CBS News, Face the Nation interview transcript, September 20, 2026.]</ref><ref name="khanna-hill-sept20">[https://www.aol.com/articles/khanna-calls-government-agency-oversee-162631000.html Ryan Mancini, The Hill via AOL, “Khanna calls for a government agency to oversee AI ‘like the FDA’,” September 20, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 20, 2026#Khanna calls for an independent federal AI regulator|September 20 digest coverage]].

== September 20, 2026: bilateral incident-notification proposal ==

Bessent said the U.S. proposed bilateral notification of AI incidents with national-security implications at September 20 talks.<ref name="bessent-ap">[https://apnews.com/article/bessent-ai-xi-trump-china-trade-2c7f54f07e755f506d9db9b91df282bd Matt Sedensky, Associated Press, “Bessent: US proposes AI incident alert system in talks with China,” September 20, 2026.]</ref><ref name="bessent-reuters">[https://www.marketscreener.com/news/us-treasury-s-bessent-and-china-s-he-launch-talks-on-ai-trade-and-critical-minerals-ce785adad089f425 David Lawder and Antoni Slodkowski, Reuters via MarketScreener, “Bessent proposes US-China AI safety notifications in talks with Chinese vice premier,” updated September 20, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#US proposes AI incident notifications in talks with China|September 21 digest coverage]].

== International scientific assessment: September 21, 2026 ==

The [[United Nations|Independent International Scientific Panel on AI]] examined loss-of-control risks in an advance thematic brief, surveying preventive and accountability mechanisms across jurisdictions.<ref name="un-agents-sept21">[https://www.un.org/independent-international-scientific-panel-ai/en/thematic-briefs/ai-agents-misalignment-risks Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, “AI Agents, Misalignment and the Risk of Losing Human Control,” advance unedited version 1, September 21, 2026, pp. 2, 4 and 14–16.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#UN scientific panel examines safeguards against loss of AI control|September 21 coverage]].

== September 21, 2026: commentary on autonomous agents and law ==

In a September 21 essay, historian Jill Lepore argues that autonomous AI agents expose gaps in legal accountability and calls for legislative responses. She uses the [[OpenAI 2026 Model Hacking Incidents|OpenAI–Hugging Face incident]] to frame the debate over whether existing legal categories adequately address systems that act independently. This is an attributed policy argument.<ref>[https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/09/28/is-ai-above-the-law Jill Lepore, “Is A.I. Above the Law?”, The New Yorker, published September 21, 2026; September 28 print issue.]</ref>

== September 21, 2026: OpenAI standards proposal ==

[[OpenAI]] called for shared capability measurements and incident protocols through national and international standards institutions.<ref name="openai-standards-sept21">[https://openai.com/index/building-standards-next-phase-ai/ OpenAI, “Building standards for the next phase of AI,” September 21, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#OpenAI proposes international frontier AI standards|the September 21 digest]] for its proposal and the existing evaluation network.

== Related articles ==

* [[OpenAI 2026 Model Hacking Incidents]] — Incident chronology, overlapping reports and September 16, 2026 disclosures.

* [[United Kingdom policy on catastrophic AI risk]]

* [[China policy on catastrophic AI risk]]

Line 161:

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* [[Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence|Executive Order 14365 — Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence]]

* [[NIST Generative AI Profile]]

== Related organizations ==

* [[AVERI]]

* [[Institute for Law & AI]]

* [[Centre for the Governance of AI]]

* [[Future of Life Institute]]

* [[Anthropic]]

* [[OpenAI]]

* [[Center for Security and Emerging Technology]]

== References ==

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-<div class="ailaw-legislation-nav" style="font-size:0.92em; margin-bottom:1.2em;">[[AI Policy]] · [[Legislation and Regulation|Legislation & Regulation]] · [[United States Federal Authorities|United States — Federal]] · [[AI Law by Topic|Browse by topic]]</div>
 '''United States policy on catastrophic AI risk''' encompasses measures intended to prevent advanced artificial intelligence from enabling mass harm or escaping effective human control. The approaches range from developer transparency and independent audits to government testing, restrictions on dangerous uses, liability, negotiated slowdowns, and proposed prohibitions on superintelligence. These approaches assign different roles to developers, regulators, courts, and national-security agencies.<ref name="ca-report">Joint California Policy Working Group on AI Frontier Models, [https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/June-17-2025-%E2%80%93-The-California-Report-on-Frontier-AI-Policy.pdf ''The California Report on Frontier AI Policy''], June 17, 2025, executive summary and sections 1–3.</ref><ref name="licensing">Senators Richard Blumenthal and Josh Hawley, [https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09072023bipartisanaiframework.pdf ''Bipartisan Framework for U.S. AI Act''], September 2023.</ref><ref name="ban">Office of Senator Bernie Sanders, [https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/news-sanders-casar-introduce-legislation-to-ban-artificial-superintelligence-and-temporarily-pause-advanced-ai-development/ ''Sanders, Casar to Introduce Legislation to Ban Artificial Superintelligence and Temporarily Pause Advanced AI Development''], September 3, 2026.</ref>
@@ Line 16: / Line 14: @@
 The California frontier-policy report approaches uncertainty differently, recommending empirical investigation and adaptable safeguards. These positions expose a policy choice about the allocation of oversight and research resources; neither a catastrophe-focused statute nor this article's narrower scope substitutes for protections against discrimination and other present harms.<ref name="ca-report" />
+In a September 18, 2026 discussion, MIT Technology Review journalists Grace Huckins and Will Douglas Heaven presented differing assessments of extinction risk. Huckins emphasized uncertainty and the need for stronger transparency rules; Heaven argued that extinction scenarios lack grounding in present capabilities and can distract from immediate harms. Both discussed difficulties in monitoring autonomous agents. Their exchange illustrates disagreement about risk framing alongside shared concern about oversight.<ref name="mittr-risk-debate">[https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/09/18/1144435/could-ai-really-kill-us-all-your-questions-answered/ Will Douglas Heaven and Grace Huckins, MIT Technology Review, “Could AI really kill us all? Your questions, answered,” September 18, 2026.]</ref>
+In a September 20, 2026 CBS interview, Nvidia’s Jensen Huang rejected near-term extinction predictions and advocated enforcing existing liability and computer-access laws.<ref name="huang-cbs">[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jensen-huang-nvidia-rejects-ai-extinction-warnings/ CBS News, Jensen Huang interview, published September 20, 2026.]</ref>
 == Comparison of approaches ==
@@ Line 23: / Line 25: @@
 | [[#State laws: transparency, audits, and preventive duties|Transparency and safety plans]] || Disclose risks and enforce compliance with developer frameworks || California SB 53<ref name="ca-ag">California Department of Justice, [https://oag.ca.gov/sb53 ''Catastrophic Risks in Artificial Intelligence Foundation Models''], official SB 53 guidance and employee-reporting information, accessed September 11, 2026.</ref>; [[New York RAISE Act]]<ref name="ny">New York Senate, [https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S8828 ''S8828, 2025–2026 session''], signed March 27, 2026, Chapter 96; text of General Business Law Article 44-B and §§ 3–5 of the amending act.</ref> || California: enacted, operative requirements.<br>New York: enacted; amended principal requirements effective January 1, 2027.
 |-
-| [[#Illinois: external audits|Independent verification]] || External examination of compliance and safety practices || [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]]<ref name="illinois">Office of Governor JB Pritzker, [https://gov-pritzker-newsroom.prezly.com/gov-pritzker-signs-nation-leading-artificial-intelligence-safety-law ''Gov. Pritzker Signs Nation-Leading Artificial Intelligence Safety Law''], July 6, 2026.</ref> || Enacted July 6, 2026; effective January 1, 2027.
+| [[#Illinois: external audits|Independent verification]] || External examination of compliance and safety practices || [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]]<ref name="illinois">Office of Governor JB Pritzker, [https://gov-pritzker-newsroom.prezly.com/gov-pritzker-signs-nation-leading-artificial-intelligence-safety-law ''Gov. Pritzker Signs Nation-Leading Artificial Intelligence Safety Law''], July 6, 2026.</ref> || Enacted July 6, 2026; Act effective January 1, 2027. Audit duty starts January 1, 2028 or 90 days after first qualifying, whichever is later.<ref name="il-enacted-dates">Illinois General Assembly, [https://my.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/PublicActs/104/104-0538.htm Public Act 104-0538], Sections 10(a), 10(d) and 99; approved July 6, 2026. Enacted text reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref>
 |-
 | [[#Licensing, mandatory testing, and federal supervision|Federal testing and oversight]] || Mandatory risk assessment or supervised testing || [[FRONTIER Act (119th Congress)|FRONTIER Act (H.R. 9925)]]<ref name="frontier">U.S. Congress, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr9925ih/html/BILLS-119hr9925ih.htm ''H.R. 9925, FRONTIER Act''], introduced July 23, 2026, especially §§ 4–9.</ref>; Secure AI Development Act<ref name="warner-release">Office of Senator Mark Warner, [https://www.warner.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warner-rolls-out-comprehensive-ai-legislative-agenda-focused-on-responsible-innovation-workers-and-national-security/ ''Warner Rolls Out Comprehensive AI Legislative Agenda Focused on Responsible Innovation, Workers, and National Security''], July 21, 2026.</ref> || FRONTIER: introduced bill, July 23, 2026.<br>Secure AI Development: published legislative proposal, July 2026.
@@ Line 48: / Line 50: @@
 === Illinois: external audits ===
+The Act takes effect January 1, 2027, but Section 10(a) starts the frontier-AI framework duty on January 1, 2028. Under Section 10(d), annual independent audits begin on January 1, 2028 or 90 days after a developer first qualifies as a large frontier developer, whichever is later.<ref name="il-enacted-dates">Illinois General Assembly, [https://my.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/PublicActs/104/104-0538.htm Public Act 104-0538], Sections 10(a), 10(d) and 99; approved July 6, 2026. Enacted text reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref>
 The [[Illinois SB 315 Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act|Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)]] adds independent third-party audits to a framework of public safety disclosures, incident reports, compliance processes, and whistleblower protections. The governor's July 6, 2026 signing announcement identifies January 1, 2027 as its effective date. Independent examination is a distinct safeguard because it introduces scrutiny beyond the developer's own public account of its practices.<ref name="illinois" />
@@ Line 89: / Line 93: @@
 The [[NIST AI Risk Management Framework]] is voluntary guidance for organizations developing, deploying, or using AI. It provides a general risk-management structure rather than a government determination that a particular model is safe.<ref name="rmf">NIST, [https://www.nist.gov/publications/artificial-intelligence-risk-management-framework-ai-rmf-10 ''Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)''], January 26, 2023.</ref> NIST's January 2025 draft misuse guidance offers a more targeted sequence: identify risks, plan responses, protect access, measure and mitigate risks before deployment, monitor misuse, and disclose practices. It cautions that safeguards can be brittle and that following the practices cannot guarantee prevention of misuse.<ref name="nist-misuse" />
-Corporate policies can link capability assessments to stronger safeguards, but their content and strength can change. Anthropic's February 2026 explanation of Responsible Scaling Policy version 3.0 separates company plans from industry-wide recommendations and describes its Frontier Safety Roadmap goals as nonbinding public targets. It also introduces recurring risk reports and external review in specified circumstances. This illustrates why a corporate roadmap, an operational commitment, and a legally required compliance framework need separate treatment.<ref name="rsp">Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/news/responsible-scaling-policy-v3 ''Responsible Scaling Policy: Version 3.0''], February 24, 2026, explanation of the revision. This citation describes that dated revision rather than asserting that it is the latest policy version.</ref>
+Corporate policies can link capability assessments to stronger safeguards, but their content and strength can change. [[Anthropic]]'s February 2026 explanation of Responsible Scaling Policy version 3.0 separates company plans from industry-wide recommendations and describes its Frontier Safety Roadmap goals as nonbinding public targets. It also introduces recurring risk reports and external review in specified circumstances. This illustrates why a corporate roadmap, an operational commitment, and a legally required compliance framework need separate treatment.<ref name="rsp">Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/news/responsible-scaling-policy-v3 ''Responsible Scaling Policy: Version 3.0''], February 24, 2026, explanation of the revision. This citation describes that dated revision rather than asserting that it is the latest policy version.</ref>
 === AI agents and military applications ===
@@ Line 119: / Line 123: @@
 === Insurance regulation and market practice ===
+For coverage and dispute guides, see [[Insurance]], [[Insurance coverage for AI-related losses]] and [[AI in insurance claims and underwriting disputes]].
 Insurance regulation already addresses insurers' own use of AI. The NAIC adopted a model bulletin in December 2023 setting expectations for written governance programs, risk management, lawful consumer outcomes, and examination records. It is guidance for state regulators rather than a model statute.<ref name="naic">NAIC, December 4, 2023, [https://content.naic.org/article/naic-members-approve-model-bulletin-use-ai-insurers “NAIC Members Approve Model Bulletin on Use of AI by Insurers”].</ref> New York's July 2024 Circular Letter No. 7 sets supervisory expectations for AI and external data in underwriting and pricing, including discrimination testing, actuarial validity, senior oversight, and vendor diligence.<ref name="dfs">New York Department of Financial Services, July 11, 2024, [https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry-guidance/circular-letters/cl2024-07 Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 (2024)].</ref> These measures govern insurance decisions; they do not require insurers to cover frontier-model catastrophes.
@@ Line 126: / Line 132: @@
 == Pacing agreements, pauses, and bans ==
+On September 13, 2026, President Trump responded to calls for an AI slowdown by emphasizing competition with China and acknowledging possible safeguards without specifying new rules.<ref name="trump-pool-sept13">[https://pool.pp.tools/reports/9002 Meridith McGraw, White House travel pool report 18, September 13, 2026, remarks at Doonbeg]. Contemporary reporter notes, archived by White House Pool.</ref><ref name="trump-ap-sept13">[https://apnews.com/article/trump-artificial-intelligence-guardrails-china-midterms-congress-9df0ebb4c1b0619aa0f88057b5a1092d Darlene Superville and Didi Tang, Associated Press, “Trump downplays the need to check AI development and says he doesn’t want to cede edge to China,” September 13, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 13, 2026#Trump stresses competition with China in response to AI slowdown calls|September 13 coverage]].
+On September 13, 2026, House Speaker Mike Johnson opposed an emergency AI moratorium and proposed industry–government talks on safeguards, citing competition with China.<ref name="cnn-johnson-sept13">[https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/sotu/date/2026-09-13/segment/01 CNN, State of the Union, interview with House Speaker Mike Johnson, September 13, 2026, 9 a.m. ET]. Rush transcript.</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 13, 2026#Johnson opposes emergency AI moratorium and proposes industry talks|September 13 coverage]].
+On September 12, CNN reported [[Dario Amodei]]’s pacing proposal and Anthropic’s commitment to embedded external evaluators.<ref name="cnn-pacing">[https://keyt.com/news/money-and-business/cnn-business-consumer/2026/09/12/anthropic-ceo-calls-for-pacing-the-frontier-of-ai-race-amid-safety-concerns/ Auzinea Bacon, CNN via KEYT, “Anthropic CEO calls for ‘pacing the frontier’ of AI race amid safety concerns,” September 12, 2026].</ref>
+On September 12, 2026, [[OpenAI]] chief executive Sam Altman endorsed [[Dario Amodei|Amodei]]’s pacing call and said OpenAI would also give independent evaluators access comparable to employees, with further details to follow. This was an announced commitment, not confirmation that the arrangement was already operating.<ref name="altman-evaluators">[https://x.com/sama/status/2098811563415150910 Sam Altman, public statement on frontier pacing and independent evaluators, X, September 12, 2026]. Full public post reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref><ref name="cnn-pacing">[https://keyt.com/news/money-and-business/cnn-business-consumer/2026/09/12/anthropic-ceo-calls-for-pacing-the-frontier-of-ai-race-amid-safety-concerns/ Auzinea Bacon, CNN via KEYT, “Anthropic CEO calls for ‘pacing the frontier’ of AI race amid safety concerns,” September 12, 2026].</ref>
+On September 12, Clément Delangue announced the Open Alignment Initiative, led by Thomas Wolf at Hugging Face, and requested participation in the embedded-evaluator program. He argued for broader participation and transparency in alignment work; the announcement does not confirm acceptance into the program.<ref name="delangue-alignment">[https://x.com/ClementDelangue/status/2098790988034580852 Clément Delangue, announcement of the Open Alignment Initiative, X, September 12, 2026]. Public post reviewed September 12, 2026.</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 12, 2026#Amodei proposes pacing AI development and embedded evaluators|September 12 coverage]].
 On September 4, 2026, [[Scott Wiener]] and other state lawmakers called for a '''Mutually Agreed Pacing Framework''': an agreement among frontier laboratories, independently verified, to pace capability development while safety work catches up. The announcement expressly presented this as additional to state, federal, and international action. Laboratory participation and an enforceable agreement would require further negotiation.<ref name="pacing" />
@@ Line 136: / Line 154: @@
 The [[EU AI Act]] combines several regulatory layers. Its prohibited-practice rules address specified unacceptable uses, while its high-risk system regime focuses on applications such as employment and access to essential services. Those categories cover harms much broader than catastrophe. The closer comparator for U.S. frontier-model policy is the Act's separate regime for <b>[[EU AI Act#General-purpose AI models|general-purpose AI models with systemic risk]]</b>: providers face additional duties to assess and mitigate those risks, with supervision by the European AI Office. General-purpose model obligations began applying in August 2025, with AI Office enforcement powers applying from August 2026, subject to the Act's transitional arrangements. A voluntary code of practice supports compliance with underlying legal obligations. This structure combines application-specific protections with model-level systemic-risk oversight, rather than treating either category as a substitute for the other.<ref name="eu-comparison">European Commission, accessed September 12, 2026, [https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai “AI Act” — regulatory framework and implementation timeline].</ref>
+== Management-based regulation ==
+[[Cary Coglianese]] and Colton R. Crum advocate adaptable risk-management duties with continuing human oversight, rather than relying principally on fixed technical prescriptions. Their 2025 scholarship concerns AI risks broadly and offers a regulatory-design comparison for frontier-AI oversight; it is not an enacted requirement or a demonstrated safety guarantee.<ref name="people-ten-leashes">[https://pennreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Coglianese-Crum-Leashes-Not-Guardrails.pdf Cary Coglianese and Colton R. Crum, Leashes, not guardrails: A management-based approach to artificial intelligence risk regulation, Risk Analysis (2025), DOI 10.1111/risa.70020]. Accessed September 12, 2026.</ref>
 == Central design questions ==
@@ Line 143: / Line 164: @@
 Finally, accountability requires attention to institutional capacity and incentives. The Blumenthal–Hawley proposal addresses conflicts of interest in an oversight body; Illinois emphasizes independent audits; and the liability debate asks whether courts and insurers can identify and deter risks effectively. These mechanisms can be combined, but none should be described as a demonstrated guarantee against catastrophic harm.<ref name="licensing" /><ref name="illinois" /><ref name="insurance" /><ref name="nist-misuse" />
+== September 14, 2026: response from China ==
+On September 14, 2026, China’s foreign ministry urged international cooperation on AI in response to [[Anthropic]] chief executive [[Dario Amodei]]’s proposal to retain US restrictions on advanced chips and chipmaking equipment. Spokesperson Guo Jiakun said confrontation and fear-based competition would undermine global AI governance.<ref name="china-ap-sept14">[https://apnews.com/article/china-anthropic-ai-us-amodei-3da458d2c078da3e60900728d59f1ae8 E. Eduardo Castillo and Chan Ho-him, Associated Press, “Beijing hits back at Anthropic CEO’s call to curb China’s AI development,” September 14, 2026].</ref>
+See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#China responds to Amodei on AI cooperation and export controls|September 14 digest]] for the response and the proposal’s international-coordination context.
+== Microsoft model-conduct consultation ==
+On September 14, 2026, Microsoft AI proposed a code for its own models centered on human control, correction and shutdown. It opened six weeks of consultation before revising the training framework. These are company policy proposals.<ref name="mai-consult">[https://microsoft.ai/news/mai-code-of-conduct/ Microsoft AI, “Humanist AI in practice: A public consultation on our Code of Conduct for MAI Models,” September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Microsoft opens consultation on human-control code for its AI models|September 14 coverage]].
+== September 14, 2026: Trump on AI safeguards ==
+President Trump argued that existing criminal and regulatory powers and presidential leadership were sufficient safeguards, while warning that opposition to AI development would benefit China.<ref name="trump-reuters-sept14">[https://wmbdradio.com/2026/09/14/trump-says-there-is-a-sick-conspiracy-against-ai-data-centers/ Bhargav Acharya and Katharine Jackson, Reuters via WMBD, “Trump says there is a sick conspiracy against AI, data centers,” September 14, 2026].</ref> His statements expressed opposition to further controls; they did not themselves create a new regulatory instrument.<ref name="trump-ap-sept14">[https://www.wtvm.com/2026/09/14/trump-dismisses-new-ai-guardrails-says-there-is-sick-conspiracy-against-ai-data-centers/ Josh Boak, Associated Press via WTVM, “Trump dismisses new AI guardrails, says there is a ‘SICK conspiracy’ against AI and data centers,” September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Trump rejects additional AI guardrails and invokes existing powers|September 14 coverage]].
+== September 14, 2026: Obama and Harris on oversight ==
+Obama called for wider public participation in AI decisions.<ref name="obama-sept14">[https://x.com/BarackObama/status/2099642023922036982 Barack Obama, public statement on AI development and public participation, September 14, 2026].</ref> Harris urged legislation, a federal oversight and testing entity, and an international treaty on dangerous uses, development speed and testing.<ref name="harris-sept14">[https://x.com/KamalaHarris/status/2099598534831911394 Kamala Harris, public statement on frontier-AI oversight and international cooperation, September 14, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 14, 2026#Obama and Harris urge government action on frontier AI|September 14 digest coverage]] for these policy proposals.
+== September 15, 2026: competing approaches in Congress ==
+On September 15, 2026, Sanders’s prepared remarks called for binding international safety rules and a US–China treaty, and announced plans to introduce the Sanders–Casar superintelligence-ban proposal the following week.<ref name="sanders-sept15">[https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/prepared-remarks-sanders-regulating-ai-is-as-american-as-apple-pie/ Office of Senator Bernie Sanders, prepared remarks for the Pro-Human Assembly, September 15, 2026].</ref> Daines opposed slowing development in competition with China and advocated discussion involving private-sector experts and public officials.<ref name="daines-sept15">[https://www.daines.senate.gov/2026/09/15/daines-on-fox-news-we-need-to-be-gold-medalists-in-the-ai-race/ Office of Senator Steve Daines, transcript excerpts from his Fox News interview on AI policy, September 15, 2026].</ref> Johnson again favored industry self-regulation and opposed a moratorium, while Senate negotiations remained unresolved, according to Roll Call.<ref name="congress-rollcall-sept15">[https://rollcall.com/2026/09/15/ai-threats-confront-a-congress-far-from-erecting-guardrails/ Allison Mollenkamp and Savannah Behrmann, Roll Call, “AI threats confront a Congress far from erecting guardrails,” September 15, 2026].</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 15, 2026#US lawmakers divide over AI pauses, regulation and competition with China|September 15 digest coverage]].
+== RAND proposal: preserving strategic options ==
+On September 15, 2026, RAND published Joel B. Predd and coauthors' ''A U.S. Strategy to Secure Geopolitical Advantage on an Uncertain Path to Superintelligence: Maintaining Freedom of Action''. The authors propose preserving the ability to choose among competing strategies as evidence develops, while pursuing U.S. geopolitical advantage and human survival and agency. This is an expert policy proposal, not an adopted government strategy.<ref name="rand-freedom-publication">RAND, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA5105-1.html ''A U.S. Strategy to Secure Geopolitical Advantage on an Uncertain Path to Superintelligence: Maintaining Freedom of Action''], published September 15, 2026, PE-A5105-1, DOI: 10.7249/PEA5105-1.</ref>
+The paper identifies five unresolved questions: the proximity of danger, human–AI coexistence, the feasibility of cooperative restraint, the possibility of decisive advantage, and the ability to suppress rival programs. It argues that both premature commitment and excessive delay can eliminate options. Its recommendations combine investment in human–AI coexistence, AI security, adaptation of national-security institutions, and societal capacity to respond, with monitoring of technological and strategic changes. The authors advocate making commitments when evidence supports them or further delay would close an option.<ref name="rand-freedom-summary">Joel B. Predd et al., [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA5100/PEA5105-1/RAND_PEA5105-1.pdf ''Maintaining Freedom of Action''], RAND, September 2026, summary, p. v. Recommendations and strategic judgments are attributed to the authors.</ref>
+== September 16, 2026: House members press for legislation ==
+On September 16, 2026, ten bipartisan House members led by Don Beyer urged House leaders to accelerate AI oversight, security and transparency legislation, including independent oversight and stronger monitoring. Their letter requested legislative action; it did not enact requirements.<ref name="beyer-letter-sept16">[https://beyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=9218 Office of Representative Don Beyer, “Bipartisan Delegation Urges House Leaders To Take Immediate Action On Artificial Intelligence,” September 16, 2026, including the letter’s full text].</ref> Four Democratic members also urged shortening or cancelling the forthcoming recess to work on safeguards.<ref name="nextgov-house-sept16">[https://www.nextgov.com/artificial-intelligence/2026/09/house-democrats-call-cancel-upcoming-recess-time-legislate-ai/416020/ Alexandra Kelley, Nextgov/FCW, “House Democrats call to cancel upcoming recess for time to legislate on AI,” September 16, 2026].</ref>
+See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#House members press leaders to advance AI legislation|September 16 digest coverage]].
+== September 16, 2026: Warren calls for a pause ==
+On September 16, 2026, Senator Elizabeth Warren called for an immediate pause in advanced AI development while lawmakers and regulators establish safeguards. She urged enforcement of existing laws and new legislation, rejected industry-led pacing as insufficient and opposed weakening antitrust protections. This was a policy statement, not an enacted pause.<ref name="warren-pause-sept16">[https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-calls-for-pause-in-advanced-ai-development/ Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, “Senator Warren Calls for Pause in Advanced AI Development,” September 16, 2026].</ref>
+Axios reported that her position stopped short of endorsing Senator Bernie Sanders’s [[Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act|proposed ban on superintelligence]], distinguishing the two approaches.<ref name="axios-warren-sept16">[https://www.axios.com/2026/09/16/warren-ai-pause Maria Curi, Axios, “Exclusive: Warren backs pause on advanced AI,” September 16, 2026].</ref>
+See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#Warren urges immediate pause in advanced AI development|September 16 digest coverage]].
+== September 17, 2026: Shapiro and transparency measurements ==
+On September 17, 2026, [[Pennsylvania AI Law|Pennsylvania]] Governor Josh Shapiro called for federal AI regulation and international cooperation, including engagement with China, at the AI Horizons Summit. His prepared remarks advocate independent third-party oversight of frontier models, transparency and safety measures. He rejected a choice between unchecked development and an indefinite halt. This is advocacy in the AI-safety policy debate, rather than a new law or executive order.<ref name="shapiro-sept17">[https://www.pa.gov/governor/newsroom/2026-press-releases/gov--shapiro-s-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-at-the-ai-horizo Governor of Pennsylvania, remarks as prepared for delivery at the AI Horizons 2026 Summit, September 17, 2026.]</ref><ref name="wesa-sept17">[https://www.wesanews.org/politics-government/2026-09-17/shapiro-calls-on-trump-to-regulate-artificial-intelligence-development Kiley Koscinski and Chris Potter, WESA, “Shapiro calls on Trump to regulate artificial intelligence development,” September 17, 2026.]</ref>
+On September 17, 2026, [[Anthropic]] published proposed measurements of AI-led research, agent oversight and computing-resource allocation to inform public scrutiny of frontier development. Its August snapshot says Claude leads 26% of measured research-and-development work under human supervision; no measured subset is fully autonomous. The company proposes external verification and acknowledges methodological limits. This is a voluntary transparency initiative relevant to the debate over pacing AI development, not a regulatory requirement.<ref name="anthropic-measures">[https://www.anthropic.com/institute/measuring-pace-of-ai-development Anthropic, “Measurements for understanding the pace of AI development inside frontier labs,” September 17, 2026.]</ref><ref name="anthropic-reuters">[https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/anthropic-says-claude-now-leads-a-quarter-of-work-building-its-next-ai-models-4906530 Reuters via Investing.com, “Anthropic says Claude now leads a quarter of work building its next AI models,” September 17, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 17, 2026#Shapiro calls for federal AI safeguards|Shapiro coverage]] and [[AI Law Wiki News for September 17, 2026#Anthropic publishes measures for monitoring frontier development|Anthropic coverage]].
+== September 16, 2026: bishops advocate safeguards ==
+The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops created an AI task force chaired by Bishop Oscar Cantú on September 16, 2026. More than a dozen bishops also met members of Congress to advocate AI safety legislation and online protections for children. This was a civil-society advocacy initiative, not government action.<ref name="bishops-sept16">[https://www.usccb.org/news/2026/us-bishops-administrative-committee-establishes-task-force-artificial-intelligence USCCB, “U.S. Bishops’ Administrative Committee Establishes a Task Force on Artificial Intelligence,” September 16, 2026.]</ref><ref name="bishops-ewtn">[https://www.ewtnnews.com/world/us/u-s-bishops-launch-task-force-to-protect-human-dignity-amid-rise-of-artificial-intelligence Daniel Payne, EWTN News, “U.S. bishops launch task force to promote human dignity amid rise of artificial intelligence,” September 16, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 16, 2026#US bishops establish AI task force and press Congress for safeguards|September 16 digest coverage]].
+== September 18, 2026: California oversight order ==
+[[California Executive Order N-9-26|California’s N-9-26 order]] directs faster implementation of independent oversight programs and recommendations by November 16 on onsite evaluators, verified safety documentation, shutdown mechanisms and incident reporting. The order directs agency work; the listed potential duties for developers remain subjects for recommendations.<ref name="ca-n9-order">[https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/FINAL-N-9-26-AI-EO-9.18.26-SIGNED.pdf Governor of California, Executive Order N-9-26, signed September 18, 2026, paragraphs 1–3.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 18, 2026#California accelerates AI oversight and seeks shutdown-safeguard recommendations|September 18 coverage]].
+== September 18, 2026: antitrust complaint over coordination ==
+In [[Buist v Anthropic PBC|Buist v. Anthropic PBC]], four consumers sued Anthropic, OpenAI OpCo LLC, SpaceXAI LLC and Google LLC, alleging an agreement to slow improvements in competing AI subscriptions. The proposed class action seeks damages and injunctive relief.<ref name="buist-complaint">[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ufb8Bg9RA9LmRKOvXSm9UbP9YITI9sDq/view Buist et al. v. Anthropic PBC et al., No. 3:26-cv-10693 (N.D. Cal.), ECF 1, filed September 18, 2026, pp. 1–7, 25–29.]</ref>
+== September 19, 2026: AI Force announcement ==
+Trump announced an AI Force and a forthcoming AI-czar appointment, emphasizing industry growth and existing criminal and civil enforcement.<ref name="trump-ai-force-post">[https://www.trumpstruth.org/statuses/41808 Donald J. Trump, Truth Social statement, September 19, 2026, 1:12 p.m. EDT, status 117298821562014906; full text preserved by Trump’s Truth.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 19, 2026#Trump announces planned AI Force and AI czar|September 19 digest coverage]].
+== September 20, 2026: Khanna on federal and international oversight ==
+Khanna advocated an expert-led federal AI regulator and internationally monitored safeguards in his September 20 CBS interview.<ref name="khanna-cbs-sept20">[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-full-transcript-09-20-2026/ CBS News, Face the Nation interview transcript, September 20, 2026.]</ref><ref name="khanna-hill-sept20">[https://www.aol.com/articles/khanna-calls-government-agency-oversee-162631000.html Ryan Mancini, The Hill via AOL, “Khanna calls for a government agency to oversee AI ‘like the FDA’,” September 20, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 20, 2026#Khanna calls for an independent federal AI regulator|September 20 digest coverage]].
+== September 20, 2026: bilateral incident-notification proposal ==
+Bessent said the U.S. proposed bilateral notification of AI incidents with national-security implications at September 20 talks.<ref name="bessent-ap">[https://apnews.com/article/bessent-ai-xi-trump-china-trade-2c7f54f07e755f506d9db9b91df282bd Matt Sedensky, Associated Press, “Bessent: US proposes AI incident alert system in talks with China,” September 20, 2026.]</ref><ref name="bessent-reuters">[https://www.marketscreener.com/news/us-treasury-s-bessent-and-china-s-he-launch-talks-on-ai-trade-and-critical-minerals-ce785adad089f425 David Lawder and Antoni Slodkowski, Reuters via MarketScreener, “Bessent proposes US-China AI safety notifications in talks with Chinese vice premier,” updated September 20, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#US proposes AI incident notifications in talks with China|September 21 digest coverage]].
+== International scientific assessment: September 21, 2026 ==
+The [[United Nations|Independent International Scientific Panel on AI]] examined loss-of-control risks in an advance thematic brief, surveying preventive and accountability mechanisms across jurisdictions.<ref name="un-agents-sept21">[https://www.un.org/independent-international-scientific-panel-ai/en/thematic-briefs/ai-agents-misalignment-risks Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, “AI Agents, Misalignment and the Risk of Losing Human Control,” advance unedited version 1, September 21, 2026, pp. 2, 4 and 14–16.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#UN scientific panel examines safeguards against loss of AI control|September 21 coverage]].
+== September 21, 2026: commentary on autonomous agents and law ==
+In a September 21 essay, historian Jill Lepore argues that autonomous AI agents expose gaps in legal accountability and calls for legislative responses. She uses the [[OpenAI 2026 Model Hacking Incidents|OpenAI–Hugging Face incident]] to frame the debate over whether existing legal categories adequately address systems that act independently. This is an attributed policy argument.<ref>[https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/09/28/is-ai-above-the-law Jill Lepore, “Is A.I. Above the Law?”, The New Yorker, published September 21, 2026; September 28 print issue.]</ref>
+== September 21, 2026: OpenAI standards proposal ==
+[[OpenAI]] called for shared capability measurements and incident protocols through national and international standards institutions.<ref name="openai-standards-sept21">[https://openai.com/index/building-standards-next-phase-ai/ OpenAI, “Building standards for the next phase of AI,” September 21, 2026.]</ref> See [[AI Law Wiki News for September 21, 2026#OpenAI proposes international frontier AI standards|the September 21 digest]] for its proposal and the existing evaluation network.
 == Related articles ==
+* [[OpenAI 2026 Model Hacking Incidents]] — Incident chronology, overlapping reports and September 16, 2026 disclosures.
 * [[United Kingdom policy on catastrophic AI risk]]
 * [[China policy on catastrophic AI risk]]
@@ Line 161: / Line 249: @@
 * [[Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence|Executive Order 14365 — Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence]]
 * [[NIST Generative AI Profile]]
+== Related organizations ==
+* [[AVERI]]
+* [[Institute for Law & AI]]
+* [[Centre for the Governance of AI]]
+* [[Future of Life Institute]]
+* [[Anthropic]]
+* [[OpenAI]]
+* [[Center for Security and Emerging Technology]]
 == References ==